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Abstract—This work in progress outlines a comparison of
anomaly detection methods that we are undertaking. We are
comparing different types of anomaly detection methods with
the purpose of achieving results covering a broad spectrum of
anomalies. We also outline the datasets that we will be using
and the metrics that we will use for our evaluation.
Keywords-Network fault diagnosis; Computer network secu-
rity;
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen a multitude of new anomaly
detection methods for computer networks. Many of these
methods specialise in detecting only a few different types
of anomalies and have therefore been evaluated against
methods detecting the same anomaly types. We are cur-
rently undertaking a broad comparison of anomaly detection
methods. This comparison focuses on anomaly detection
methods from several different approaches. A range of meth-
ods representative of their approaches have been selected.
These methods will be evaluated using several different
publicly available datasets. The evaluation of the methods
will establish overall performance of the different methods
and establish their strengths and weaknesses in terms of
the types of anomalies they can detect. The primary aim
of this work is to establish a base set of methods and
their evaluations to which other methods can be added and
reliably compared in the future.
A. Motivation
There is a lot of research going into inventing new or
improving upon existing anomaly detection methods. While
new methods have normally been compared to previous
work, this has frequently been a comparison only to other
methods of the same type, primarily the older methods that
they extend. There are two main reasons for this. The first
is that there a lack of standardised implementations of the
methods that can be used in the evaluations. It is difficult to
find published code for anomaly detection and our enquiries
have revealed few authors willing to share their code with
us. The second major problem in the field is that there
are no common datasets evaluation of anomaly detection
methods beyond the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) datasets [1] and these have well known
problems. Most evaluations of new methods use the DARPA
datasets together with a second, different dataset. However
due to privacy reasons, these secondary sets are not normally
able to be shared and are therefore different between each
evaluation.
To alleviate the first problem, we are performing a com-
parison of anomaly detection methods in networks. Methods
from a range of different approaches will be evaluated
against each other in the comparison. The goal is to make the
framework and the implementations public to the research
community to facilitate easier comparisons.
To alleviate the second problem we will use publicly
available datasets, and if new datasets are required, we will
make every effort to ensure it can be freely published.
B. Paper Organisation
The following section outlines the related work to this
paper. Section III contains a definition of the anomalies
we use, an outline of the methods that is used for the
comparison, the data sets that will be used and a brief
explanation of the evaluation criteria. The final section of
the paper provides a brief view of where we intend to focus
our future research.
II. RELATED WORK
There have been other comparisons of network anomaly
methods. These studies focus on comparing a few similar
methods.
Cottrell et al. [2] compared different time series forecast-
ing methods to detect anomalies in end to end bandwidth.
The data that they used was obtained through active mea-
surements and they were looking for anomalies in available
bandwidth over end-to-end links. The paper is valuable
because of the comparison of forecasting methods and shows
that the forecasting methods used are applicable to several
different traffic features.
Lazarevic et al. [3] surveyed several clustering based
anomaly detection methods and a support vector machine
classifier. They evaluated their data on the DARPA 98
dataset and real time internet traffic. The real time traffic
was labelled using Snort. The comparison does, however,
focus on only one type of anomaly detection method and
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does not explore the limitations of the methods nor what
they are best suited for.
Ca´rdenas et al. [4] created a framework for evaluating
intrusion detection systems. The paper suggests using a
different measure to compensate for the skewed distributions
of the problem. We will draw upon their experiences in our
evaluation.
We focus on doing a broader comparison of different types
of anomaly detection methods that detect different types of
anomalies.
III. COMPARISON OF ANOMALY DETECTION METHODS
Methods will be classified based on their ability to detect
different types of events and the performance of the method.
Computational performance will not be taken into account in
this comparison but the ability to detect anomalies in near
real time is requirement for the longer term aims of our
research project.
Every method will be evaluated on several datasets and
attempts will be made to establish what the different methods
are most suitable for.
A. Anomaly Classification
In this paper, we focus on two different types of events,
network faults and security anomalies. Network faults in-
dicate an error in the network, while security anomalies
indicate that one or more sources are adversely affecting
the network in a negative manner. We make this distinction
because the different anomaly detection methods that are
investigated are demonstrated as more suitable for different
types of anomalies by their authors.
1) Network Faults: Network faults are considered to be
non-malicious in their origin but can still have an adverse
effect on the network.
We divide network faults into two main categories: hard-
ware failures and configuration errors.
Hardware Faults: Hardware faults cause an abrupt
cessation of traffic over the affected area. Examples are
faulty network interfaces or a physical link being severed.
Configuration Errors: Configuration errors are more
difficult to detect than hardware faults. They are gener-
ally caused by the operator choosing an improper setting
for some or all of the networking equipment. This can
cause symptoms such as higher-than-normal latencies, over-
saturated links, underused links and inefficient routing.
2) Security Anomalies: Security anomalies are malicious
in nature. No distinction is made between Internet back-
ground radiation [5] and specific attacks or probes [6].
Security anomalies can be divided into two types, probes
and attacks.
Probes: Probes are attempts to map the network or the
services running on a specific node in a network. A well
known example of these are port scans.
Attacks: Attacks attempt to disrupt one or more nodes
on the network or attempt to saturate the links in the network
itself. Examples are worms [7] and Denial of Service attacks
[8].
B. How the Methods Were Chosen
Only methods using data on a flow level or higher are
included in this comparison. Flow level means that we look
at the network flows as the most fine grained input data
for the anomaly detection methods. Higher levels of data
mean either aggregation of collected data, for example traffic
volumes, or metrics extracted from a series of flows.
Methods that examine individual packets tend to rely on
heuristics or signatures and are extremely computationally
expensive on fast links. This makes such methods unsuitable
since it will be difficult to use those methods in near real
time detection. An example of this is Snort’s hardware
requirements to keep up with a 1 gigabit link.
In addition to this, only data from passive measurements
is used. It is possible that active measurement data might
be included in the future. Passive measurement means that
traffic has been captured at a critical link in a network,
normally where it will provide a good view of the behaviour
of the network.
A small subset of all of the available methods have
been chosen due to practical reasons. We have attempted
to choose at least two methods using approaches from the
same field. The methods chosen from each field are expected
to detect the same types of anomalies. Since several of the
methods will be able to detect both security anomalies and
network faults, the methods will be classified according to
the different types of anomalies that they can detect.
The methods chosen in each category had to have a
good description and be straightforward to implement and
have published performance results. Methods were preferred
if they had been the basis for modifications by other re-
searchers.
C. Methods Chosen
Out of the vast multitude of available anomaly detection
methods only a small subset has been chosen for the compar-
ison. The aim of the comparison is not to be exhaustive but
rather to establish a base of standardised implementations of
anomaly detection methods. Future research can then add to
the established base.
The following methods will be included in the compari-
son. Further methods might be added during the course of
the comparison.
1) Forecasting Methods: Brutlag [9] introduced using the
Holts Winters Exponential forecasting method in networks.
The method is good at detecting volume anomalies while
still adapting to the diurnal trends in a network.
Soule et al. [10] uses Kalman filters to forecast the
network traffic using traffic matrices.
8
Currently only a simple test based on standard deviation
is used to flag events. More sophisticated tests will be
implemented in the future.
Based on the authors’ own evaluations of these methods,
they can be expected to detect hardware faults and config-
uration errors in the network and attacks upon the network.
Probes that does not significantly affect the network might
not be detected by these methods.
2) Signal Analysis Methods: Kim and Reddy [8] created
a technique that looks at the frequency of IP addresses
in a trace over an egress router. Their method combines
correlation computations with a wavelet transform to create
data in which they then look for outliers. The detector that
they use is a simple threshold based detector based on
standard deviation with a trigger buffer.
Kim and Reddy’s evaluation of the method shows that it
deals well with both traffic anomalies and attacks upon the
network.
We are still searching for another suitable method in this
category.
3) PCA based methods: Lakhina et al. [11] introduced
a new set of Principal Component Analysis (PCA) based
anomaly detection methods that we will use in our compar-
ison.
Li et al. [12] created a method that relies on sketch sub-
spaces to detect anomalies. The method can detect individual
flows that are anomalous.
The methods show a good ability to detect network faults
successfully and some security anomalies.
4) Clustering: Breunig et al. [13] created a density based
clustering method. Lazarevic et al. included it in their survey
and it was the best overall clustering method.
A second clustering algorithm will be used but it is not
decided which at the moment of writing.
5) Other Methods: Eimann et al. [14] have successfully
used T-entropy to detect network anomalies. The method
extracts an entropy measure across various attributes in a
network flows and creates an aggregate number for the
network that changes during anomalies.
This method is the only exception to the criteria men-
tioned in the previous subsection. The method was chosen
because the source code was available to us and we think
that the approach is sufficiently different from most other
approaches to warrant our attention.
D. Data sets
These are the datasets that we use in the comparison of
the different anomaly detection methods.
1) WITS Archive: The WITS archive [15] contain a
collection of traces captured at the University of Auckland
and University of Waikato in New Zealand. The traces have
been captured with DAG cards developed by Endace [16].
The network users’ privacy anonymising the addresses and
truncating packets.
2) Internet2 Observatory: The Internet2 observatory [17]
provides a complete view of the core Internet2 network in
the U.S.A. They do however not provide full capture data
like the two other datasets that we use. Instead, they capture
1% of the data that flows through the network and complete
NetFlow data.
User privacy is ensured by only retaining 21 bits of the
address fields.
Because this dataset does not contain a full passive
capture, it is possible that some methods will not perform
as well on this dataset as they would on a full dataset. The
dataset is still valuable since it contains captures from several
core routers.
3) DARPA Datasets: There are three DARPA datasets
created in 1998, 1999 and 2000. They are artificially created
datasets that contain synthetic background data and real at-
tacks against hosts. They are the only fully labelled datasets
we have, but there has been criticism put forward towards
the dataset and it is 10 years old.
4) Possible New Datasets: We are investigating the pos-
sibility of creating a new passive dataset using available
network capture facilities. We will label the data with
Snort [18], which has become a de facto standard, before
anonymising the dataset. The ambition is that the wider
community can use this dataset to detect both security
anomalies and network faults and that it will be adopted
in future evaluations.
E. Evaluation
We will use the labelled DARPA datasets to establish the
Receiver Operating Characteristics (ROC) of the different
anomaly detection methods. ROC curves are useful for
determining how effective a classifier is without taking the
class distribution into account. Area Under the ROC Curve
(AUC) is a very useful metric [19] of how well an algorithm
performs. Unlike accuracy, the AUC does not depend of the
distribution of the data. However, labelled data is necessary
to establish these two metrics.
The two unlabelled datasets will be used for a comparative
evaluation and each detected anomaly will be examined
by an expert to establish whether it is a true positive or
a false positive. We will try to avoid false negatives by
running the methods on as high sensitivity as possible before
applying more optimal settings. It is however unlikely that
all anomalies will be detected since the other datasets are
not synthetic.
All of the methods examined will be classified according
to the anomalies they can detect. They will be classified
according to the types of anomalies that we established
earlier in this section. Some methods can also work on more
than one type of in data. An example of this is Holts Winters
forecasting algorithm. Brutlag introduced it in a paper where
he detected volume anomalies whereas Cottrell et al. used
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it to detect changes of available bandwidths over paths in
networks.
Methods that can take different types of traffic features
as their input will be evaluated on the features suggested in
literature.
IV. FUTURE WORK
We will continue to add methods to our comparison
framework until we have a suite of anomaly detection
methods that can detect different categories of anomalies
with a certain overlap. We will then investigate different
approaches of data fusion to improve on the original results
derived from the methods themselves.
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